References – Aid Relationship

 

-        Adam, C., G. Chambas, P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont Jeanneney, and J.W. Gunning, 2004, “Performance-Based Conditionality: A European Perspective”, World Development 32(6): 1059-1070.

-        Adam, C., and J.W. Gunning, 2002, “Redesigning the Aid Contract: Donors’ Use of Performance Indicators in Uganda”, World Development, 30(12): 2045-2056.

-        Adam, C., and S. O’Connell, 1999, “Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Economics and Politics, 11(3): 225-253.

-        Alesina, A., and D. Dollar, 2000, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”, Journal of Economic Growth 5(1): 33-63.

-        Archarya, A., A. Fuzzo de Lima, and M. Moore, 2004, “Aid Proliferation: How Responsible are the Donors?”, IDS Working Paper 214.

-        Azam, J.-P., and J.-J. Laffont, 2003, “Contracting for Aid”, Journal of Development Economics 70(1): 25-58.

-        Becker, G., 1983, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3): 371-400.

-        Boone, P., 1996, “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid”, European Economic Review 40(2): 289-329.

-        Burnside, C., and D. Dollar, 2000, “Aid, Policies, and Growth”, American Economic Review 90(4): 847-868.

-        Burnside, C., and D. Dollar, 2004, “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence”, Policy Research Working Paper 3251, Washington: The World Bank.

-        Collier, P., and D. Dollar, 2002, “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction”, European Economic Review 46(8): 1475-1500.

-        Collier, P., P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont, and J.W. Gunning, 1997, “Redesigning Conditionality”, World Development 25(9): 1399–1407.

-        Cordella, T., and H. Ulku, 2004, “Grant Versus Loans”, IMF Working Paper 04/161, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

-        Cordella, T., and G. Dell’Ariccia, 2003, “Budget Support versus Project Aid”, IMF Working Paper 03/88, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

-        Cordella, T., and G. Dell’Ariccia, 2002, “Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs”, IMF Working Paper 02/115, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

-        Dabla-Norris, E., 2002, “A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies”, in G. Abed and S. Gupta (eds), Governance, Macroeconomics, and the IMF, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

-        De Renzio, P., with D. Booth, A. Rogerson, and Z. Curran, 2005, “Incentives for Harmonisation and Alignment in Aid Agencies”, ODI Working Paper 248, London: Overseas Development Institute.

-        Devarajan, S., and and V. Swaroop, 1998, “The Implications of Foreign Aid Fungibility for Development Assistance”, Policy Research Working Paper 2022, Washington: The World Bank.

-        Dixit, A., 2003, “Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-Developed Countries”, Economics and Politics 15.

-        Dollar, D., 2003, “Reforming Foreign Aid – Eyes Wide Open”, Harvard International Review.

-        Dollar, D., and V. Levin, 2004, “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-2002”, Policy Research Working Paper 3299, Washington: The World Bank.

-        Dollar, D., and J. Svensson, 2000, “What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?”, Economic Journal 110(466): 894-917.

-        Drazen, A., 2000, Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton University Press.

-        Drazen, A., 1999, “What is Gained by Selectively Withholding Foreign Aid?”, Working Paper, University of Maryland.

-        Easterly, W., 2003, “The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid”, Journal of Policy Reform 5(4): 1–28.

-        Easterly, W., 2001, The Elusive Quest for Growth. Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, Cambridge: MIT Press.

-        Easterly, W., R. Levine, and D. Roodman, 2003, “New Data, New Doubts: A Comment on Burnside and Dollar’s “Aid, Policies, and Growth” (2000)”, NBER Working Paper 9846, National Bureau of Economic Research.

-        European Commission (EC), 2003, Guidelines for European Commission Support to Sector Programmes, Brussels, February.

-        Halonen-Akatwijuka, M., 2004, “Coordination Failure in Foreign Aid”, Policy Research Working Paper 3223, Washington: The World Bank.

-        Hansen, H., and F. Tarp, 2001, “Aid and Growth Regressions”, Journal of Development Economics 64: 547-570.

-        Kanbur, R., and T. Sandler, 1999, “The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods”, ODC Policy Essay No. 25, Washington: Overseas Development Council.

-        Killick, T., 2004, “Politics, Evidence and the New Aid Agenda”, Development Policy Review, 22 (1): 5-29.

-        Killick, T., 1997, “Principals, Agents, and the Failing of Conditionality”, Journal of International Development 9: 483-495.

-        Knack, S., and A. Rahman, 2004, “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients”, Policy Research Working Paper 3186, Washington: The World Bank.

-        Lahiri, S. and P. Raimondos-Møller, 2004, “Donor Strategy Under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid”, Economics and Politics 16(2): 213-231.

-        Laffont, J.-J., and D. Martimort, 2002, The Theory of Incentives. The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press.

-        Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge and London: MIT Press.

-        Laplagne, P., M. Treadgold, and J. Baldry, 2001, “A Model of Aid Impact in Some South Pacific Microstates”, World Development 29(2): 365-383.

-        Lundborg, P., 1998, “Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange”, Economics and Politics 10(2): 127–141.

-        Martens, B., with U. Mummert, P. Murrell and P. Seabright, 2001, The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid, Cambridge University Press.

-        Martens, B., 2001, “The Role of Evaluation in Foreign Aid Programmes”, in Martens et al., pp. 154-177.

-        Mayer, W., and A. Mourmouras, 2002, “Vested Interests in a Political Theory of IFI Conditionality”, IMF Working Paper 02/73, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

-        Mosley, P., J. Harrigan, and J. Toye, 1995, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending, 2nd edition, London: Routledge.

-        Mummert, U., 2001, “Embedding Externally Induced Institutional Reforms”, in Martens et al., pp. 112-153.

-        Murrell, P., 2001, “The Interaction of Donors, Contractors, and Recipients in Implementing Aid for Institutional Reform”, in Martens et al., pp. 69-111.

-        Murshed, S.M., and S. Sen, 1995, “Aid Conditionality and Military Expenditure Reduction in Developing Countries: Models of Asymmetric Information”, Economic Journal 105(429): 498-509.

-        Ndulu, B.J., 2002 “Partnership, Inclusiveness and Aid Effectiveness in Africa”, in Fitzgerald, Valpy (ed), Social Institutions And Economic Development: A Tribute to Kurt Martin, Institute of Social Studies, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic, pp. 143-168.

-        Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), 2003, Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery, Paris: OECD.

-        Olson, M., 1982, The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven: Yale University Press.

-        Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, available on http://aidharmonisation.org .

-        Paul, Elisabeth, 2006, “A Survey of the Theoretical Economic Literature on Foreign Aid”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 20(1) (May): 1-17.

-        Pedersen, K., 2001, “The Samaritan’s Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid”, International Tax and Public Finance 8(5): 693-703.

-        Pedersen, K., 1997a, “The Political Economy of Distribution in Developing Countries: A Rent-Seeking Approach”, Public Choice 91(3): 351-373.

-        Pedersen, K., 1997b, “Aid and Poverty Alleviation in Case of Asymmetric Information – Some Elementary Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory”, NHH Discussion Paper 26/95 (Revised September 29, 1997), Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.

-        Pedersen, K., 1996, “Aid, Poverty Alleviation and Incentives”, NHH Discussion Paper 25/95 (Revised September 1996), Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.

-        Pedersen, K., 1995, “Rent-seeking, Political Influence and Inequality – A Simple Analytical Example”, Public Choice 82: 281-305.

-        Rajan, R., and A. Subramanian, 2005a, “What Undermines Aid’s Impact on Growth?”, IMF Working Paper 05/126, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

-        Rajan, R., and A. Subramanian, 2005b, “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?”, IMF Working Paper 05/127, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

-        Sachs, J., 1989, “Conditionality, Debt Relief and Developing Country Debt Crisis,” in J. Sachs (ed), Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Vol. 1. International Financial System, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

-        Seabright, P., 2001, “Conflicts of Objectives and Task Allocation in Aid Agencies”, in Martens et al., pp. 34-68.

-        Stiglitz, J., 1998, “Towards a New paradigm for Development”, 9th Prebisch Lecture, Geneva: UNCTAD.

-        Svensson, J., 2003, “Why Conditional Aid Does Not Work And What Can Be Done About It?”, Journal of Development Economics 70(2): 381-402.

-        Svensson, J., 2000a, “Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking”, Journal of International Economics 51(2): 437-461.

-        Svensson, J., 2000b, “When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality”, Journal of Development Economics 61(1): 61-84.

-        Svensson, J., 1999, “Aid, Growth and Democracy”, Economics and Politics 11(3): 275-297.

-        Tarp, F., and P. Hjertholm, 2000, Foreign Aid and Development – Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future, London and New York: Routledge.

-        Torsvik, G., 2005, “Foreign Economic Aid; Should Donors Cooperate?”, Journal of Development Economics 77(2): 503-515.

-        Villanger, E., 2005, “Company Interests And Foreign Aid Policy: Playing Donors Off Against One Another”, European Economic Review, In Press.

-        Wane, W., 2004, “The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?”, Policy Research Working Paper 3325, Washington: The World Bank.

-        White, H., and O. Morrissey, 1997, “Conditionality When Donor and Recipient Preferences Vary”, Journal of International Development 9: 497-50.

-        Wolfensohn, J., 1999, “A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework” to the Board, Management, and Staff of the World Bank Group, Washington: The World Bank (January 21).

-        World Bank, 1998, “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why”, Policy Research Report, New York: Oxford University Press.