References – Corruption in Developing Countries

Acemoglu, D., and T. Verdier, 2000, “The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption”, American Economic Review, Vol. 90, pp. 194-211.

 

Ahrend, R., 2002, “Press Freedom, Human Capital and Corruption”, DELTA Working Papers 2002-11, (Paris: DELTA).

 

Akerlof, G., 1982, “Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchanges”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 97(4), pp. 543-569.

 

Andvig, J., and K. Moene, 1990, “How Corruption May Corrupt”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 13, pp. 63-76.

 

Bac, M., 1996, “Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies”, Journal of Comparative Economics 22(2), pp. 99-118.

 

Bako-Arifari, N., 2001, “La corruption au port de Cotonou : Douaniers et Intermédiaires”, Politique Africaine 83, pp. 38-58.

 

Banerjee, A., 1997, “A Theory of Misgovernance”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112(4), pp. 1289-1332.

 

Basu, K., S. Bhattacharya, and S. Misra, 1992, “Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 349-359.

 

Becker, G., and G. Stigler, 1974, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 1, pp. 1-18.

 

Besley, T., and R. Burgess, 2002, “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117(4).

 

Besley, T., and J. McLaren, 1993, “Taxes and Bribery: the Role of Wage Incentives”, Economic Journal, Vol. 103 , pp. 119–141.

 

Bhagwati, J., 1982, “Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90(5), pp. 988-1002.

 

Blundo, G., and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, 2001, “La Corruption Quotidienne en Afrique de l’Ouest”, Politique Africaine Vol. 83, pp. 8-37.

 

Blundo, G., 2001, “ Dessus-de-table  - La Corruption Quotidienne dans la Passation des Marchés Publics Locaux au Sénégal”, Politique Africaine Vol. 83, pp. 98-114.

 

Broadman, H., and F. Recanatini, Francesca, 2002, “Corruption and Policy: Back to the Roots,” Journal of Policy Reform, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 37-49.

 

Brunetti, A., and B. Weder, 2003, “A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption”, Journal of Public Economic, Vol. 87, pp. 1801-1824.

 

Buchanan, J., R. Tollison, and G.Tullock (eds), 1980, Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University Press).

 

Campos, E., and S. Pradhan, 1996, “Budgetary institutions and expenditure outcomes : binding governments to fiscal performance”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1646, (Washington: The World Bank).

 

Cappelli, P., and K. Chauvin, 1991, “An Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis”, Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 106, pp. 769-788.

 

Chakraborty, S., and E. Dabla-Norris, 2005, “Rent Seeking,” IMF Staff Papers (forthcoming).

 

Chomitz, K., G. Setiadi, A. Azwar, and N. Ismail Widiyarti, 1998, “What Do Doctors Want?: Developing Incentives for Doctors to Serve in Indonesia’s Rural and Remote Areas”, World Ban; Policy Research Working Paper 1888, (Washington: The World Bank).

 

Dabla-Norris, E., and S. Freeman, 2004, “Enforcement of Property Rights and

Underdevelopment,” Review of Development Economics, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 391-405.

 

Dabla-Norris, E., 2002, “A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies”, in G. Abed and S. Gupta (ed.) Governance, Macroeconomics, and the IMF, (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

Damania, R., P. Fredriksson, and M. Mani, 2003, “The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence,” Public Choice, Vol. 121 ( 3), pp. 363-390.

 

Danninger, S., M. Cangiano, and A. Kyobe, 2005, “The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience from Low Income Countries,” IMF Working Paper 05/2 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

Davis, J., 2004, “Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia’s Water and Sanitation Sector”, World Development, Vol. 32 (1), pp. 53-71.

 

Devarajan, S., D. Dollar, and T. Holmgren (eds), 2001, Aid and Reform in Africa. Lessons from Ten Case Studies (Washington: The World Bank).

 

Dia, M., 1996, “Africa’ s Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions”, Directions in Development (Washington: The World Bank).

 

Dickens, William, Lawrence Katz, Kevin Lang, and Lawrence Summers, 1989, “Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle”, Journal of Labor Economics 7 (July), pp. 31-347.

 

Di Tella, R., and E. Schargrodsky, 2002, “Political and Economic Incentives during an

Anti-corruption Crackdown,” in D. Della Porta and S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), Corrupt

Exchanges: Empirical Themes in the Politics and Political Economy of Corruption

(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft).

 

Easterly, W., 2001, The Elusive Quest for Growth. Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, (Cambridge: MIT Press).

 

Gatti, R., S. Paternostro, and J. Rigolini, 2003, “Individual Attitudes toward Corruption: Do Social Effects Matter?”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3122 (Washington, The World Bank).

 

Goldsmith, A., J. Veum, and W. Darity, Jr., 2000, “Working Hard for the Money? Efficiency Wages and Worker Effort”, Journal of Economic Psychology 21(4), pp. 351-385.

 

Heller, P., 2005, “Understanding Fiscal Space”, IMF Policy Discussion Paper No. 05/4 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

Holmström, B., 1979, “Moral Hazard and Observability”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10(1), pp 74-91.

 

Holmström, B., and P. Milgrom, 1991, “Multi-Task Principal–Agent Analyzes: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52.

 

International Monetary Fund, 2005, World Economic Outlook (September).

 

International Monetary Fund, 2003, World Economic Outlook (April).

 

International Monetary Fund, 1998, IMF Survey 27(8) (April 27).

 

Kaufmann, D., G. Mehrez, and T. Gurgur, 2002, “Voice or Public Sector Management? An Empirical Investigation of Public Sector Performance based on a Survey of Public Officials,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (unpublished; Washington: World Bank)

 

Kaufmann, D., and A. Kraay, 2002, “Growth without Governance”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2928 (Washington: The World Bank).

 

Keefer, P., 2005, “Democratization and Clientelism: Why Are Young Democracies Badly Governed?”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3594 (Washington: The World Bank).

 

Keefer, P., and S. Khemani, 2005, “Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services”, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 20(1), pp. 1-27.

 

Keefer, P., and R. Vlaicu, 2004, “Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3472 (Washington: The World Bank).

 

Laffont, J., and D. Martimort, 2002, The Theory of Incentives. The Principal-Agent Model, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).

 

Leruth, L., and E. Paul, 2005, “The Design of Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries. Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory for Institutional Strengthening”, IMF Working Paper (forthcoming; Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

Lienert, I., 2003, “A Comparison Between Two Public Expenditure Management Systems in Africa”, IMF Working Paper No. 03/2 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

Martens, B., with U. Mummert, P. Murrell, and P. Seabright, 2002, The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

 

Mauro, P., 1995, “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110 (3), pp. 681–712.

 

Mauro, P., 2004, “The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 51 (1), pp. 1-18.

 

Mauss, M., 1923-1924, “Essai Sur le Don. Forme et Raison de l’échange Dans les Sociétés primitives”, Année Sociologique, seconde série.

 

Médard, J.-F., 1992, “Le Big Man en Afrique : Esquisse d’analyse du Politicien Entrepreneur”, L’année Sociologique, 42, pp. 169-172.

 

Mookherjee, D., L. Png, 1995, “Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They be Compensated,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, pp. 145-159.

 

Moussa, Y., 2004, “Public Expenditure Management in Francophone Africa: A Cross-Country Analysis”, IMF Working Paper 04/42 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

Moynihan, D., and S. Pandey, 2005, “The Role of Organizations in Fostering Public Service Motivation”, Public Administration Review (forthcoming).

 

Niskanen, W., 1971, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, (Chicago: Aldine/Atherton Press).

 

Olken, B., 2005, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” (unpublished; Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).

 

Paul, E., and E. Dabla-Norris, 2006 “What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail: An Analysis of Rent Capture”, IMF Working Paper 06/146 (June).

 

Paul, E., and M. Robinson, 2007, “Performance Budgeting, Motivation and Incentives”, in Performance Budgeting: Linking Funding and Results, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (forthcoming).

 

Petrie, M., 2003, “Promoting Fiscal Transparency: The Complementary Roles of the IMF, Financial Markets, and Civil Society,” IMF Working Paper 03/199 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

Poncelet, M., G. Pirotte, G. Stangherlin, and E. Sindayihebura, 2005, Les ONG en Villes Africaines, (Louvain-La-Neuve: Academia).

 

Rauch, J., 2001, “Leadership Selection, Internal Promotion, and Bureaucratic Corruption in Less Developed Politics,” Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 240-258.

 

Rauch, J., and P. Evans, 2000, “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 75 (1), pp. 49–71.

 

Recanatini, Francesca, Alessandro Prati, and Guido Tabellini, 2005, "Why Are Some Public Agencies less Corrupt than Others? Lessons for Institutional Reform from Survey Data”, Jacques Polak Sixth Annual Research Conference, (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

Reinikka, R., and J. Svensson, 2005, “Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda”, Journal of European Economic Association, (forthcoming).

 

Reinikka, R., and J. Svensson, 2004, “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119 (2), pp. 679-705.

 

Robinson, J., and T. Verdier, 2002, “The Political Economy of Clientelism”, CEPR Discussion Paper 3205, (London: Center for Economic and Policy Research).

 

Rose-Ackerman S., 1978, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, (New York: Academic Press).

 

Sarte, P., 2001, “Rent-seeking Bureaucracies and Oversight in a Simple Growth Model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 25, pp. 1345-1365.

 

Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1993, “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, pp. 599-617.

 

Svensson, J., 2003, “Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118 (1), pp. 207-230.

 

Tirole, Jean, 1996, “A Theory of Collective Reputations”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 63, pp. 1-22.

 

Van Rijckeghem, C., and B. Weder, 1997. “Corruption and the Rate of Temptation - Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?,” IMF Working Papers 97/73 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

 

World Bank, 1997, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. (Washington: The World Bank).

 

World Bank, 2000, “Bolivia. From Patronage to a Professional State. Bolivia Institutional and Governance Review”, Report No. 20115-BO, (Washington: The World Bank).