References – Workers’ Motivation and Incentives

Akerlof, George (1982), “Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchanges”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 97(4): 543-569.

Arrowsmith, J., Steve French, Mark Gilman, and Raymond Richardson (2001), “Performance-Related Pay in Health Care”, Journal of Health Services Research and Policy 6(2): 114-119.

Atkinson, Adele, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen Slater, and Deborah Wilson (2004), “Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for Teachers in England”, CMPO Working Paper No. 04/113, University of Bristol.

Averill, Richard F., Michael J. Kalison, James C. Vertrees, and Norbert I. Goldfield, 1996, “Achieving Short-Term Medicare Savings Through the Expansion of the Prospective Payment System,” Health Care Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp.18–25.

Baker, George (2002), “Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts”, Journal of Human Resources 37(4): 728-751.

Baker, George, Michael Jensen, and Kevin Murphy (1988), “Compensation and Incentives: Practice versus Theory”, Journal of Finance 43(3): 593-616.

Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin Murphy (1994), “Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 1125-1156.

Barkema, Harry, Paul Geroski, and Joachim Schwalbach (1997), “Managerial compensation, strategy and firm performance: an introduction”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 15(4): 413-416.

Baron, James (1988), “The Employment Relation as a Social Relation”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 2(4), 492–525.

BBC (1999), “Warning over Teacher’s Performance Pay”, 22 September 1999, at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/specials/green_paper/453862.stm.

Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole (2003), “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation”, Review of Economic Studies 70(3): 489-520.

Besley, Timothy, and Maitreesh Ghatak (2003a), “Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents”, typescript, London School of Economics (September).

Besley, Timothy, and Maitreesh Ghatak (2003b), “Incentives, Choice and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services”, Oxford Review of Economic policy 19(2): 235-249.

Borjas, George (2000), Labor Economics (Second Edition), McGraw-Hill.

Bray, Nancy, Carol Carter, Allen Dobson, Michael J Watt and Stephen Shortell, 1996, “An Examination of Winners and Losers under Medicare’s Prospective Payment System,” Health Care Management Review, Volume 19, No. 1, p. 44 passim.

Brewer, Gene (2005), “In the Eye of the Storm: Frontline Supervisors and Federal Agency Performance”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15(4): 505–527.

Buchan, James, Marc Thompson, and Fiona O’May (2000), “Health workforce incentive and remuneration – A research review”, Issues in health services delivery, Discussion paper No. 4, Geneva: World Health Organization.

Burgess, Simon, and Marisa Ratto (2003), “The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19(2): 285-300.

Burgess, Simon, and Paul Metcalfe (1999a), “The use of incentive schemes in the Public and Private sectors: Evidence from British Establishments”, CMPO Working Paper 99/015, University of Bristol.

Burgess, Simon, and Paul Metcalfe (1999b), “Incentives in organisations: A selective overview of the literature with application to the Public Sector”, CMPO Working Paper 99/016, University of Bristol.

Burgess, Simon, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, and Carol Pepper (2001), “The Intricacies of the Relationship Between Pay and Performance for Teachers: Do teachers respond to Performance Related Pay schemes?”, CMPO Working Paper No. 01/35, University of Bristol.

Cameron, Judy, and W. David Pierce (1994), “Reinforcement, reward, and intrinsic motivation: A meta-analysis”, Review of Educational Research 64(3): 363-423.

Che, Yeon-Koo, and Seung-Weon Yoo (2001), “Optimal incentives for teams”, American Economic Review 91(3): 525-541.

Coulam, Robert F and Gary L Gaumer, 1991, “Medicare’s Prospective Payment System: A Critical Appraisal,” Health Care Financing Review, 1991 Annual Supplement, pp. 45–77.

Courty, Pascal, and Gerald Marschke (2004), “An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives”, Journal of Labor Economics 22(1): 23-56.

Dabla-Norris, Era (2002), “A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies”, in G. Abed and S. Gupta (ed.) Governance, Macroeconomics, and the IMF, (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

Dabla-Norris, Era, and Elisabeth Paul (2005), “What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail. Fail. An Analysis of Rent Capture in Developing and Transition Countries”, IMF Working Paper (forthcoming; Washington: International Monetary Fund).

Deci, Edward, Richard Koestner, and Richard Ryan (1999), “A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation”, Psychological Bulletin 125(6), 627–668.

Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole (1999), “The Economics of Career Concerns”, Review of Economic Studies 66(1): 183-217.

Dia, Mamadou (1996), “Africa’s Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions”, Washington: The World Bank, 306 pages.

DiIulio, John (1994), “Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a Federal Government Bureaucracy”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 4(3): 277-318.

Dixit, Avinash (2002), “Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review”, Journal of Human Resources 37(4): 696-727.

Easterly, William (2001), The Elusive Quest for Growth. Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Ehrenberg, Ronald, and Robert Smith (1997), Modern Labor Economics. Theory and Public Policy (Sixth Edition), Addison-Wesley.

Eisenberger, Robert, and Judy Cameron (1996), “Detrimental Effects of Reward: Reality or Myth?”, American Psychologist 51(11): 1153-1166.

Falk, Armin, and Ernst Fehr, 2002, “Psychological Foundations of Incentives”, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 3185.

Fehr, Ernst, and Bettina Rockenbach (2003), “Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism”, Nature 422: 137-140.

Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus Schmidt (2004), “Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal–Agent Model”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106(3): 453-474.

Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter (1999), “Collective action as a social exchange”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 39(4): 341–369.

Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher (2004), “Social Norms and Human Cooperation”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, 185-190.

Fehr, Ernst, Simon Gachter, and Georg Kirchsteiger (1997), “Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence”, Econometrica 65(4): 833-860.

Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher, and Simon Gächter (2002), “Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms”, Human Nature 13: 1-25.

Feltham, Gerald, and Jim Xie (1994), “Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations”, Accounting Review 69(3): 429-453.

Ferraro, Fabrizio and Jeffrey Pfeffer (2005), “Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling”, Academy of Management Review, 30(1), pp. 8-24.

FitzRoy, Felix, and Kornelius Kraft (1995), “On the choice of incentives in firms”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 26 (1): 145-160.

Foss, Nicolai, and Keld Laursen (2005), “Performance pay, delegation and multitasking under uncertainty and innovativeness: An empirical investigation”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 58(2): 246-276.

Francois, Patrick (2000), “’Public Service Motivation’ as an Argument for Government Provision”, Journal of Public Economics 78: 275-299.

Frey, Bruno (1997), “On the Relationship between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 15(4): 427-439.

Frey, Bruno, and Felix Oberholzer-Gee (1997), “The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out”, The American Economic Review; (87)4: 746-55.

Frey, Bruno, and Reto Jegen (2001), “Motivation Crowding Theory”, Journal of Economic Surveys 15(5): 589– 623.

Garen, John (1998), “Self-employment, pay systems, and the theory of the firm: An empirical analysis”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 36(2): 257-274.

Gatti, Roberta, Stefano Paternostro, and Jamele Rigolini (2003), “Individual Attitudes toward Corruption: Do Social Effects Matter?”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3122 (Washington, The World Bank).

General Accounting Office (2002), Results-Oriented Cultures: Insights for U.S. Agencies from Other Countries’ Performance Management Initiatives, GAO-02-862, Washington: GAO.

General Accounting Office (2005), Managing For Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927, Washington: GAO.

Gibbons, Robert (1998), “Incentives in Organizations”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4): 115-32.

Gintis, Herbert, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr (2003), “Explaining altruistic behavior in humans”, Evolution and Human Behavior 24: 153–172.

Gneezy, Uri and Aldo Rustichini (2000), “Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 791-810.

Gosden, Toby, Frode Forland, Ivar Sonbo Kristiansen, Matthew Sutton, Brenda Leese, Antonio Giuffrida, Michelle Sergison, and Lone Pedersen (2001), “Impact of Payment Method on Behaviour of Primary Care Physicians: A Systematic Review”, Journal of Health Services Research and Policy, 6, pp. 44-55.

Government Performance Project (2003), Paths to Performance in State & Local Government: a Final Assessment from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Accessed 13 January 2004 at www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp/about/facts.asp .

Gupta, Dipak, C. Richard Hofstetter, and Terry Buss (1997), “Group utility in the micro motivation of collective action: The case of membership in the AARP”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 32(2): 301-320.

Gupta, Nina, and Jason Shaw (1998), “Let the Evidence Speak: Financial Incentives Are Effective!!”, Compensation and Benefits Review 30(2): 26, 28-32.

Heckman, James, Carolyn Heinrich, and Jeffrey Smith (2002), “The Performance of Performance Standards”, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Autumn), pp. 778-811.

Herzberg, Frederick (1968), “One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?”, Harvard Business Review (Jan-Feb): 53-62.

Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom (1991), “Multi-Task Principal–Agent Analyzes: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 24-52.

Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom (1994), “The Firm as an Incentive System”, American Economic Review 84(4): 972–991.

House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (2003), On Target: Government by Measurement, Fifth Report of Session 2002-2003, HC 62-1, London: The Stationery Office Limited.

Houston, David (2000), Public-Service Motivation: A Multivariate Test”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10(4): 713-727.

Ingraham, Patricia (1993), “Pay for Performance in the States”, American Review of Public Administration, 23 (3), September, pp 189-200.

Janssen, Maarten, and Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst (2004), “The Price of a Price: On the Crowding Out and In of Social Norms”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 55(3): 377-395.

Jenkins, G. Douglas, Jr., Atul Mitra, Nina Gupta, and Jason Shaw (1998), “Are Financial Incentives Related to Performance? A Meta-Analytic Review of Empirical Research”, Journal of Applied Psychology 83(5): 777-787.

Kahn, Charles, Emilson Silva, and James Ziliak (2001), “Performance-based wages in tax collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and its effects”, Economic Journal 111(468), pp.188-205.

Kandel, Eugene, and Edward Lazear (1992), “Peer Pressure and Partnership”, Journal of Political Economy, 100(4): 801-817.

Kellough, J. Edward and Haoran Lu (1993), “The Paradox of Merit Pay in the Public Sector”, Review of Public Personnel Administration, Spring, pp 45-64.

Kohn, Alfie (1998), “How Incentives Undermine Performance”, The Journal for Quality and Participation, 21(2), pp. 6-13.

Kole, Stacey (1997), “The Complexity of Compensation Contracts”, Journal of Financial Economics 43(1): 79–104.

Kreps, David (1997), “Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives”, American Economic Review 87(2): 359-64.

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Lazear, Edward (2000), “Performance Pay and Productivity”, American Economic Review 90(5): 1346-1361.

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Leete, Laura (2000), “Wage equity and employee motivation in nonprofit and for-profit organizations”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 43(4): 423-446.

Lepper, M., and D. Greene (1978), “Overjustification Research and Beyond: Toward a Means-Ends Analysis of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation”, in M. Lepper and D. Greene (eds), The hidden cost of reward: new perspectives on the psychology of human motivation, Hillsdale, NJ/ Erlbaum.

Leruth, Luc, and Elisabeth Paul (2005), “The Design of Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries. Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory for Institutional Strengthening”, IMF Working Paper (forthcoming; Washington: International Monetary Fund).

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Moynihan, Donald, and Sanjay Pandey, “The Role of Organizations in Fostering Public Service Motivation”, Forthcoming in Public Administration Review.

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